Objective. This study explored if and to what extent the laws of U .S . states mirrored the U .S . federal laws for responding to nuclear-radiological emergencies (NREs) .
An earthquake of magnitude 9 hit the east coast of Japan on March 11, 2011 , and triggered a tsunami that severely damaged the building holding the Unit 1 reactor of the Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. The Japanese government declared a nuclear emergency and ordered an evacuation of 170,000 people within a 12-mile radius of the power plant. 1, 2 This accident precipitated the reassessment of nuclear and radiological response procedures in nations around the world. 3 In the United States, there are 65 nuclear power plants operating 104 reactors, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Eighteen of these reactors are-like Fukushima-Daiichi-more than 40 years old, and five of the nuclear power plants are located within or near areas of geologic activity. 4, 5 Assuming an affected area comparable with that of Fukushima-Daiichi, an evacuation around these reactors' range would affect at least several thousand and up to a half-million people. The total number of people living within the same distance from all the nuclear power plants is about 7 million-about 2% of the entire U.S. population. 6 This number is steadily increasing, 7 as America's rural areas become suburban population centers. Moreover, these power plants are aging, and the on-site storage of highly radioactive used reactor rods is increasing.
The National Response Framework (NRF) 8 prepared by the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency describes the responsibilities of the federal departments and agencies governing immediate response and short-term recovery activities. The NRF specifies coordinating roles for the departments of Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, as well as the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. It adds cooperating roles for most of those departments and also for the departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs.
The NRF recognizes that "state, tribal, and local governments have primary responsibility for the protection of the public;" thus, it provides information for state responders to emergency incidents and guides state-level planning and preparedness efforts. Many-though not all-responsibilities of state governments mirror those of the federal agencies listed The states included in the study were Alaska, California, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wisconsin . b The power plants are color-coded according to their numbers of years in service . For multi-unit plants, the average age was taken .
in federal laws. In carrying out their public-protection responsibility, governments cooperate with and rely upon private-sector organizations and professionals that comprise state and local public health systems. 9, 10 Taken together, the governmental and private-sector entities contributing to a nuclear-radiologic disaster response constitute a network of actors also called a public health system (PHS), connected by mutual roles and responsibilities that are defined by laws, policies, and emergency plans. Network analysis 11 is, therefore, a useful approach to analyzing the characteristics and qualities of disaster response networks. It can describe network characteristics, analyze complex patterns of relationships, and produce graphic results. Previous studies have applied network analysis to communication patterns of workers within local health departments, 12 to word co-occurrence and citation patterns in the U.S. Code, 13 and to citation patterns in French legal codes. 14 However, network analysis has not previously been applied as a methodology to examine the legally directed functions among agents in a PHS. 15 In this study, we used network methods to analyze the roles and responsibilities among these entities as specified by state and federal government laws for preparedness, response, and recovery activities in nuclear and radiological emergencies.
METHODS
This study took advantage of the existence of a developing inventory 16 of preparedness laws from a sample of states and the federal government. We applied a prototype tool for network visualization and analysis to this body of law, which had been numerically coded for use with network analysis. A complete description of the legal preparedness inventory and the coding methodology appear in a previous publication. 17 Here, we review the sample of inventory states, summarize the coding method, and describe its application to this study.
States represented in the Legal Preparedness Inventory
At the time of this study, a diverse group of states was represented in the growing Legal Preparedness Inventory, including Alaska (AK), California (CA), Florida (FL), Kansas (KS), Maryland (MD), New York (NY), North Dakota (ND), Ohio (OH), Pennsylvania (PA), Rhode Island (RI), Texas (TX), and Wisconsin (WI) (collectively "study states"). As shown in Figure 1 , our study states included (1) at least one representative state from each of the 10 regions designated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; 18
(2) a sampling of both predominately rural or predominately urban populations, as well as with diverse emergency types; 19 and (3) most with nuclear power plants (excepting AK, ND, and RI).
Additionally, the research team coded the U.S. federal government emergency laws according to the same method to allow comparisons between the federal and state laws.
Coding legal texts for network analysis
The texts of the relevant laws constitute directives that define relationships and inter-responsibilities among responders to a nuclear-radiologic disaster. For the purpose of this study, the responders were "agents" representing many of the governmental roles defined by laws as well as additional private-sector entities within local, state, and federal PHSs. Figure 2 lists the agents in nuclear-radiologic response networks, along with abbreviations (to identify them in network visualizations) and explanatory definitions.
We used numerical representations in coding the legal directives within the following categories:
• Acting agent: the organization, group, or individual whose activity the law directs ( Figure 2 )
• Partner agent: the organization, group, or individual with which the law defines a relationship to the PHS acting agent ( Figure 2 ), including "none" when the legal directive states no particular partner
• Purpose: the phase of emergency to which a legal directive pertains, either preparedness (i.e., planning for a disaster or emergency before it occurs), response (i.e., lessening or mitigating the impact of a disaster or emergency after it occurs), or recovery (i.e., responding to the impact of an emergency after it has ended in an attempt to return to a normal state). The legal directives included those that explicitly addressed a nuclear-radiological emergency (NRE) and those addressing nonspecified emergency types. We also combined the laws for NREs with nonspecified emergency laws and denoted it by NRE+.
Network analysis
We entered all coded information into Microsoft ® Excel spreadsheets for use with network analysis library Igraph. 20 We used Pajek to generate network visualizations. 21 Among many possible network measurements, those measurements chosen as relevant to this study were density, inclusiveness, degree, and strength. 11, [22] [23] [24] [25] • Density is the total number of connections in a graph, expressed as a proportion of the maximum 
All public health agents AllPHAgents
A global term that is used when a statute or regulation speaks to "all" or "any" public health agent .
Administrative agencies
AdminAgencies A federal, state, or local department/agency/division/committee/commission/authority that is not part of the legislative or judicial branches and that has power delegated to it by Congress or the state legislature to make administrative decisions .
Business/ employer
Business An institution, organization, person, or other entity that pays a salary or wages to an employee(s) . This definition does not include the United States, any state or political subdivision of a state, or any agency thereof as an employer .
Civic Civic
A nonprofit entity that is organized primarily for civic, fraternal, or charitable purposes (e .g ., the American Red Cross, volunteers/volunteer organizations, and food banks,) .
Community health center CHC
A public or incorporated nonprofit health facility that provides comprehensive primary health care to citizens in a community (e .g ., poison control centers, drug facilities, and ambulatory care facilities) .
Corrections Corrections
An entity responsible for supervising adults and juvenile offenders, including their confinement, detention, care, and treatment .
Department of Environmental Protection
DEP An executive branch agency/department/division/committee/commission/authority at the federal or state level responsible for ensuring clean air, clean water, and clean soil .
Department of Agriculture
DoA An executive branch agency/department/division/committee/commission/authority at the federal or state level responsible for agricultural development, animal/plant health, food safety and inspection, and the like .
Department of Transportation
DoT An executive branch agency/department/division/committee/commission at the federal or state level responsible for the safety and mobility of the transportation system .
Doctor/healthcare provider
Doctor A person required by state or federal law or regulation to be licensed, registered, or certified to provide health-care services (e .g ., physicians, nurses, medical examiners/coroners, pharmacists, social workers, and health-care therapists/specialists) .
Elected officials ElectedOfficials
People voted into positions of government, including federal, state, county, local, or regional levels of jurisdiction (e .g ., president, governor, commissioner, and county executive) . For the purpose of this analysis, legal statements create "directed networks" because any agent may either act toward another or receive action from another. In such a directed network, the measure of degree has two parts: an agent's in-degree is the number of connections directed to it, and its out-degree is the number of connections directed from it. In a legal network, a high-degree or central agent is a relatively important contributor so that its absence or malfunction would probably impair the response.
• Strength is a measure used in weighted networks, 22 taking into account the frequency of agents' pairings-both the incoming (in-strength) and outgoing (out-strength) connections of each agent. For each agent, the out-strength is the number of outgoing directives or responsibilities (i.e., the frequency of citations as an acting agent), and the in-strength is the number of incoming directives or load from other agents (i.e., the frequency of citations as a partnering agent). Thus, high average strength networks have relatively more directives among their agents, suggesting much interrelatedness.
RESULTS
The Table and Figures 3 and 4 present the results of legal network analysis in the sample states and the federal government. Figure 3 shows agents named by state and federal government laws in network maps for all purposes for NREs. The Table also includes the number of legal directives for jurisdiction, such that each directive is a discrete representation of an acting agent, partner agent, and purpose in a state or the federal government law. Figure 4 compares the out-strength measurements of agents among the sample states and across the purposes of preparedness, response, recovery, and all purposes.
Network maps
The network maps of Figure 3 provide visual signals for important characteristics of NRE legal networks as measured by the corresponding values in the Table. For example, the sparse networks for AK, MD, and ND in Figure 3 are shown as having very few legal directives in the Table; these state legal networks can be compared with the highly defined and more dense NRE legal networks found in the laws of CA, NY, OH, and TX-all with lines of code exceeding 2,200-and in the federal laws with 4,584 lines of code. Similarly, in the networks shown in Figure 3 , the relative size of the node representing an agent is proportional to its out-strength, so that highly cited acting agents in each network appear as larger nodes. The high out-strength agents in many of the networks are administrative agencies, businesses, elected officials, emergency management, and the public. The weight of lines connecting two agents indicates the frequency of legal directives defining them as acting and partner pairs. The arrows on lines indicate incoming and outgoing directives. For the NRE networks, these high-degree agents vary from network to network but often include emergency management, business, elected officials, and administrative agencies.
The visually dense NRE legal networks shown in Figure 3 for CA, KS, NY, PA, and RI are reflected in density measures of .6% and for the federal govern-ment in a density measure of 20%; whereas the sparse NRE legal networks of AK and ND shown in Figure 3 are reflected in the Table density measures of 0.7% and 0.0% (after the agent "None" is ignored), respectively.
The fact that states' NRE networks often fail to include agents corresponding to those of the federal government also appears both visually and quantitatively. Figure 3 shows non-included agents as lacking connecting edges and, as the Table represents, states' legal network inclusiveness values range from 0% for ND to 64% for NY-all low compared with the federal inclusiveness value of 79% for NRE networks. The legal networks for NRE+ are usually highly inclusive (67%-96%), but the federal network is still the most inclusive one (100%).
Quantitative network measurements
The Table shows the network measurements for all PHS agents in states' legal networks for NRE and NRE+. Network measurements show that the networks for NRE are less connected (i.e., have lower degrees), less inclusive (i.e., more agents are not even cited), and less dense (i.e., the connections are distributed over a small subset of agents) than the networks for NRE+. In all study states, the density and inclusiveness of networks are lower for the purpose of recovery than for other purposes, indicating that the response-purpose laws may specify roles for a lower proportion of PHS agents and are therefore not well distributed over the network.
The average degree for PHS agents varies among states for "all" purposes: For NRE+, the average number of connections among PHS agents is highest in NY (10.75) and TX (10.36) and lowest in AK (3.21) and ND (3.71) (two of the states without nuclear power plants). The other state without a nuclear power plant, RI, has relatively greater density, inclusiveness, and average degree. Although RI does not have nuclear power plants, its neighboring states do. Thus, there is great difference in these states' legal attention to defining interrelationships among PHS agents. Across all states, average degrees of PHS agents are higher for preparedness and response purposes than for the recovery purpose. In other words, the laws mandate more task-based relationships among the agents of PHS for preparedness and response purposes, whereas the laws specific to recovery from an NRE are not too many and do not create that many task-based relationships in the legal network. The federal government network has relatively high average degree (9.54) but not the highest compared with states for NRE+, whereas the average degree for NRE is the highest (5.36) in the federal government, twofold more than the next largest, which implies that the federal government statutes put much more emphasis on the NREs than the study states did by mandating agents to work with a greater number of other agents (Table) . The average strength of PHS agents (including both in-strength and out-strength) is greatest in each of the study states for the response phase and least for the recovery phase. For NRE+, the average strength of PHS agents is highest in NY (119.54), followed by RI (91.75) and CA (80.79), and the average strength of NY is more than 10 times as high as that of the lowest-average state, AK (9.36). For NRE, the average strength in the network is much lower than in the network for NRE+. The highest average strength belongs to RI (11.14) followed by NY (10.46) and PA (7.79). Some states have very low average strength, such as AK (0.17) and MD (0.75). ND does not even have a statute for NRE, resulting in an empty legal network. Differences of strength this great suggest that the states' approaches with respect to the allocation of functions during an emergency vary substantially. The federal government cites agents much more frequently by giving them more tasks with other agents, creating very high average strength values, such as 222.46 for NRE+ and 56.36 for NRE (Table) . Figure 4 shows the out-strength of each of the 29 PHS agents for each of the 12 states and the federal government for each purpose (e.g., preparedness, response, and recovery) and for all purposes combined for NRE. On the grayscale, darker tones denote higher out-strength agents. Across all purposes and in most states, the agents with consistently high out-strength are administrative agencies, businesses, elected officials, emergency management agencies, and the public. Most of these agents also have high out-strength even for the recovery purpose. PHS agents with low out-strength include community health centers, civic, corrections, faith institutions, home health-care agencies, Indian tribes, long-term care, laboratories, mental health, and mass transit. We observed some interesting results, including (1) MD puts more emphasis than other states on the Department of Environmental Protection except for the recovery purpose, (2) MD and ND do not cite elected officials in their recovery laws, and (3) unlike in other jurisdictions, ND's emergency laws do not frequently cite businesses.
Network out-strength of individual PHS agents

DISCUSSION
Traditional legal analysis is a tool for interpreting statutes and regulations, but it is not particularly well suited to measuring relationships within systems. Such measurements are in the domain of network analysis. Network analysis can describe network characteristics, analyze complex patterns of relationships, and produce results graphically. Previous studies have applied network analysis to many areas; however, quantitative network analysis has never been applied to legal preparedness. Network analysis provides not only a visualization of the interconnected agents, but also a set of quantitative measurements helpful to gain insight into understanding its complexity.
As a guide for state-level emergency planning, the U.S. laws provide for inclusion of many more agents than are typically named in the laws of the states sampled. Although some federal responsibilities (e.g., nuclear regulation and foreign relations) have no state counterparts, many of the agents not cited in state laws have responsibilities that should be considered relevant. Even states without nuclear power plants (e.g., AK, ND, and RI) may experience the impacts of nuclear-radiologic incidents in other states (e.g., contaminated water and food and an influx of evacuee populations.)
Many sample states did not often specify healthcare providers (e.g., community health centers, home health-care agencies, hospitals, laboratories, long-term care, and mental health), as indicated by their low strength values. The importance of these PHS agents in emergencies is obvious, although their absence from the law may not necessarily equate to their absence from emergency activities.
MD-a state with a relatively sparse NRE response network-has risk exposure from nuclear power plants of its own, as well as from plants in adjacent states. Agents in its NRE network have an average strength of 0.75, well below those of other states with such risk exposure. Although MD is alone among the study sample states in having this anomaly, the same may be true of other U.S. states whose laws have not undergone network analysis. Lawmakers and planners in states such as MD might use the laws defining response networks in other states to suggest models for creating greater strength in their own NRE response networks.
The high out-strength of some agents, including elected officials and administrative agencies in many states' NRE legal networks, implies that their incapacity or ineffectiveness could have negative implications for the effectiveness of response. States having a high concentration of strength among relatively few agents might consider legislating or planning for redundancy in their specified roles and highly focused training for such roles.
Limitations
Several aspects of this study give rise to limitations. First, for many practical purposes, traditional legal analysis must be done to discern the substantive content of legal directives. The network methods described in this article should be considered as a complement to-rather than a substitute for-traditional legal analysis. Further research should explore the substantive content of the legal directives identified in this study only in terms of their network properties.
Second, statutes and regulations undergo frequent revision, so our results should be viewed as a snapshot of the sample states' NRE networks. The inventory of laws for this study was created in 2011 and fully updated as of May 2013. Additionally, the study states whose laws are reviewed in this article are not necessarily representative of all states.
Third, the laws analyzed in this study do not necessarily describe the actual conduct of agents in NRE situations, nor do they necessarily describe fully the response networks that may arise in practice. We did not code or analyze plans and policies affecting state NRE response, such as State Emergency Operations Plans. Nevertheless, modifications and additions of responsibility might arise in practical experience, and this analysis could contribute to improving NRE response if such practice-based modifications were used to indicate the need for legal amendments.
CONCLUSIONS
Network analysis provides quantitative measures and graphic visualizations for complex patterns embedded in NRE laws, facilitating interpretation and comparison by non-lawyers. This analysis of NRE incident networks as defined by laws from sample states and the federal government draws attention to issues for lawmakers, emergency planners, and researchers. State-level lawmakers and planners might consider whether or not greater inclusion of agents, modeled on the federal government, would enhance their NRE laws and whether or not more agents should be engaged in planning and policy-making for NRE incidents. Further research should explore whether or not and to what extent legislated NRE directives impose constraints on practical response activities including emergency planning. Also, coding plans/policies in addition to statutes and actual communication patterns among agents in a network framework would shed more light on the dynamics of emergency preparedness and response.
